CAF Flightline Maintenance Should Reorganize to Align with AFFORGEN Published Sept. 2, 2024 By Lt. Col. Dan Langan Wild Blue Yonder--Maxwell AFB -- “One of the key lessons from World War II was that the price of reorganizing and developing new processes for command and control during wartime impeded effective operations.”--Don Snyder, et al, Command and Control of U.S. Air Force Combat Support in a High-End Fight (2021). The current structure of Combat Air Forces (CAF) organizational-level aircraft maintenance is not aligned with the new Air Force Force Generation (AFFORGEN) framework, misses an opportunity to better develop rated officers, and, most importantly, is inadequate to meet the challenges posed by high-intensity combat within the ACE scheme of maneuver. In the first 50 years of its existence, U.S. Air Force maintenance re-organized to meet shifting operational demands an average of once every 14 years.[1] However, despite multiple upheavals in the strategic landscape and numerous resource challenges facing the Air Force since the late 1990s, the CAF’s current structure has survived with little meaningful change for more than two decades. The historical lessons from Air Force major combat operations over the last 80+ years show us that maintenance organizational structure has continuously evolved to meet shifting operational demands. With those lessons in mind, it is time to return CAF organizational-level (“flightline”) maintenance to the operational squadrons in order to enhance combat effectiveness and unify the Mission Generation force element, as well as to more effectively develop Air Force tactical leaders over the long term. Despite several evolutionary reforms since the Combat Wing structure took hold in 2002, the current organizational structure of flightline maintenance remains unable to shed its most central and inescapable flaw: it violates the principle of Unity of Command. Conceived during the post-Cold War “peace dividend”, the Combat Wing was intended to maximize efficiency in a fiscally constrained and relatively light expeditionary environment. It survived the entirety of the Global War on Terrorism and has somehow remained (with some modification) the structure of choice in the new Great Power competition era. Though presented as “COMO 2.0”, the recent adoption of the Fighter/Bomber/Rescue Generation Squadrons, or (X)GS, changed little about how we train, deploy, and fight. Rather, this reform has taken an already disjointed sortie generation effort and fractured it even further. The (X)GS reform was designed to reduce the span of control of large maintenance squadrons and to align the mission of the (X)GS with the operational squadrons – an aim that has, thus far, been successful. However, the framework of the AFFORGEN force element model has thrown that effort into disarray. While well-intended, the new structure fails to solve the most critical question of Operations and Maintenance force design, one that has existed since 2002: Who is in charge when units deploy, and why is it different than at home? Decades of Aircraft Maintenance Squadron (AMXS) commanders have struggled with this question, usually resorting to relying on good relationships with their operational squadron counterparts to muddle through the chain of command issue. Until recently, the problem was largely solved by deploying units into existing expeditionary wing structures during contingency taskings and leaving shorter-term TDYs to internal ad hoc agreements. Now, however, Air Force squadrons face a prospect of large-scale deployments into regions where no standing Air Expeditionary Wings exist. The leadership of a Mission Generation force element deploying with two commanders (a Fighter Squadron and FGS, for example) into a pacing threat scenario will quickly find themselves at odds with the force structure of PACAF or USAFE Air Expeditionary Wings, organized with the intent is that all forces at a given contingency location fall under a single rated commander. In this model, it is currently unclear what becomes of the (X)GS Commander. By instituting the (X)GS, the aircraft maintenance community has perpetuated a problem at a smaller scale that AFFORGEN was intended to solve; namely, to provide a clear and easily understood force presentation model that does not change from in-garrison to a deployed environment. Instructively, airpower history offers several lessons in the value of having a solitary commander leading the mission generation effort. During World War II, US forces in the Pacific fought to secure and hold airfields throughout the first and second island chains. Early in this campaign they were under constant enemy attack from the air and the sea and were forced to overcome contested logistics along multiple legs of the supply chain. These challenges should sound familiar, because the same problem looms over the Pacific once again. The obstacles US forces will encounter in a modern Pacific conflict pose striking similarities to what previous generations faced, and the lessons learned in those conflicts are still starkly relevant. Prominent among these lessons is that a unified command structure is immensely beneficial to marshalling all available manpower and resources in the chaotic environment of a contested airfield.[2] On 7 August 1942, U.S. Marines landed on Guadalcanal and began a long, bloody campaign to wrest the island and its strategically located airfield from Japanese control. Facing grueling conditions and constant bombardment from enemy air and naval forces, the Marines, later joined by Army, Navy, and Army Air Force personnel, managed to establish a functioning airfield by early September. Brig Gen Roy Geiger (USMC) held overall command of MAW-1, an air wing that comprised multiple fighter and bomber units from the Marines, Navy, and Army Air Force.[3] Instead of a parallel, stove-piped command structure for operations and maintenance, the entire joint Mission Generation force element (or the contemporary equivalent) existed under a unitary chain of command, with BG Geiger reporting to the overall commander of U.S. forces on the island. Ultimately, these forces were victorious.[4] Following World War II, the newly formed USAF faced different but similarly daunting challenges with the snowballing requirements of sprawling infrastructure and equipment needed to maintain more complex aircraft. In addition, the specter of a global nuclear war fought largely from CONUS bases compelled Air Force leaders to place greater emphasis on optimizing the efficiency of in-garrison operations. As a result, the service re-organized into the “wing-base” structure, with four functionally aligned Groups including the Maintenance and Supply Group, closely resembling the model that exists today. In 1956, maintenance was further centralized by creating Organizational Maintenance Squadrons, removing flightline maintenance from the operational squadrons for the first time. Adoption of this new structure continued piecemeal across several MAJCOMs through the 1960’s. Throughout this period, this initiative was met with mixed reviews. Proponents of the changes saw the new model as more efficient, delivering combat capabilities faster and with fewer resources. However, detractors argued that this efficiency would sacrifice combat effectiveness, contending that “while workable for normal peacetime stabilized operation, [this structure] does not seem to provide the flexibility of control and mobility of operations required in time of war.”[5] Ultimately, the demands of continuous overseas combat in Vietnam proved the detractors correct. The Air Force abandoned the wing-base model, and organizational-level maintenance was re-absorbed by the operational squadrons.[6] The most common argument against folding flightline maintenance under a flying squadron usually revolves around concerns that rated commanders lack the needed understanding and expertise, and that fleet readiness would suffer accordingly. Stories abound within the maintenance community of examples from the pre-Combat Wing era of poor maintenance practices driven by the operational demands of the moment. However, this is an argument for better training and development of rated leaders, not for divorcing ops and maintenance in combat. In fact, the Air Force already entrusts flying Wing Commanders, who are invariably rated officers, to lead the overall mission generation effort. The Wing Commander relies on their senior maintenance representative, usually the Maintenance Group Commander, to advise them on maintaining the proper balance between short-term operational demands and long-term fleet readiness. There is no reason this same constructive relationship cannot exist at the Squadron level, with a rated Ops Commander and a Director of Maintenance coequal to the rated Director of Operations. Under this construct, it is vital that the Squadron Commander is held accountable for the state of their fleet through readiness reporting metrics and other assessments, providing a forcing function for that commander to factor fleet health into their decision-making. Furthermore, the Air Force should invest in formal training for rated officers in the FGO ranks so they understand better the demands of the entire weapons system sustainment enterprise and good flightline maintenance practices. Force development is an additional consideration for consolidating field-level operations and maintenance. Eliminating the flightline maintenance squadrons will allow our rated leaders, some of whom will eventually rise to senior leadership positions within the Air Force, to have a tactical-level leadership experience with large units of young Airmen. Currently, the first time many rated officers lead a large, enlisted-heavy formation is as a Wing Commander. By broadening the development and understanding of rated commanders, the service will eventually produce a more well-rounded Air Force senior leadership cadre better steeped in the entire mission generation machine, as well as the larger Air Force and DoD sustainment enterprise. While these force development considerations are important for the long-term viability of operational and maintenance leadership, the most pressing concern remains, as first discussed, presenting an AEW comprising MGFEs and other sustainment forces to the Combatant Commanders that is unified, easily understood, and prepared to be lethal, effective, and agile under the ACE scheme of maneuver. The historical fluctuations of maintenance organization show that systems designed to optimize peacetime efficiency eventually break down in wartime when faced with the demand for combat effectiveness. Instead of waiting for an exchange of ordnance in the West Pacific or over the Baltics to figure out a better solution on the fly, the Air Force should optimize its organizations now to enable a seamless transition to combat and to allow units to train like they will fight. The question has never been whether flightline maintenance “belongs” under ops, but rather one of determining the most effective structure based on current operational demands. The Air Force has asked and answered this same reoccurring question many times in its history. With the current strategic outlook, today’s answer to that question is that the CAF must unify the (X)GS with the operational squadrons. In the future, with a different strategic outlook, it is possible the answer to that question may be different. For now, it is critical that the Air Force maintenance community subordinate its parochial interests to provide the best chance for victory. Allowing flightline maintenance to be organized under the flying squadrons will accomplish exactly that. Lt Col Langan is a career aircraft maintenance officer and currently the Deputy Commander of the 5th Maintenance Group, Minot AFB, North Dakota. This research began during his 2024 DAF Fellowship assigned to Argonne National Laboratory, Lemont, IL. [1] Lt. Col. Thomas E. Reiter, “USAF Aircraft Maintenance Organizational Structure: Where We’ve Been, Where We Are, What’s the Future” Air War College Research Report, 1989. [2] Maj. Jeff D. Philippart, “The Expeditionary Airfield as a Center of Gravity: Henderson Field during the Guadalcanal Campaign (August 1942-February 1943)” Air Command and Staff College Wright Flyer Paper, 2004, pg. 16. [3] Maj. Timothy L. Clubb, “CACTUS Airpower at Guadalcanal,” Command and General Staff College paper, 1996, pg. 106; David T. Orletsky et al, “How Can the Mobility Air Forces Better Support Adaptive Basing? Appendixes A-C, supporting Analyses of Adaptive Basing, Soft Power and Historical Case Studies,” Santa Monica: RAND, 2023, pg. 60. [4] Clubb, pg. 42. [5] Col. Edmund J. Borowski, “The Suitability of the USAF Aircraft Maintenance System for Total War,” Air War College paper, 1952, pg. 50. [6] David George et al, “Logistics History: The New Wing Structure Consists of Four Groups: The Operations Group, Maintenance Group, Mission Support Group, and Medical Group,” Air Force Journal of Logistics 28, no. 4 (2004): pg. 35.