Still Frozen: What Does an ‘Ice-Free’ Arctic Really Mean? Published Sept. 19, 2024 By Maj. David "Squints" Ince Since October 2023, Houthi rebel attacks in the Red Sea have reduced shipping traffic through the Suez Canal by as much as 80%. Safety concerns and rising insurance costs stemming from these attacks have forced many operators to instead opt for much less efficient shipping routes around the African Cape. As shippers deal with the increased operating costs and time associated with avoiding this logistical choke point, it’s rational to consider what alternative routes might exist to minimize costs and keep the global economy churning. Transpolar shipping routes, especially the Northern Sea Route, offer maritime routing between European and East Asian markets that avoids the Red Sea while simultaneously offering a 40% shorter travel distance. As the globe warms and the idea of an ‘ice-free’ Arctic becomes more and more of a reality, it’s tempting to consider what new opportunities may lie in the Arctic; however, it’s important to understand the true meaning of ‘ice-free’ and the operational limitations that come with changing access to the high north. What Does ‘Ice-Free’ Really Mean? For decades, climate scientists have warned of global warming’s outsized impacts on the Arctic and offered predictions for a date in the not-so-distant future where the Arctic Ocean might be ice-free. These predictions are usually paired with climate change initiatives and images of polar bears perched precariously on ever dwindling islands of ice. While I don’t for a second doubt the very real consequences of human activity on the global climate (and the imminent need to address climate change), the term ‘ice-free’ has significantly different meaning between the science community and the cliché polar bear images a layperson might envision. The ice-free descriptor is a bit of a misnomer. The ice-free moniker falls short of recognizing the huge amounts of remaining sea-ice that will exist for the majority of the year. This persistent sea-ice will continue to make Arctic trans-polar shipping operations economically impracticable for the foreseeable future. The idea of an “Ice-Free Arctic” is understood in the scientific community to mean an Arctic Ocean wherein the minimum annual sea-ice extent falls below a 1 million square kilometer threshold. For context, according to NASA’s Earth Observatory, the Arctic’s sea-ice coverage has historically fluctuated annually between about 14 million square kilometers in late winter to roughly 7 million square kilometers in late summer. In recent years the annual fluctuations have generally trended down but have only ever reached a recorded minimum of 3.39 million square kilometers in 2012. For the past decade or so, minimum sea-ice coverage levels have remained relatively steady in the ballpark of around 4.5 million square kilometers with this annual low typically occurring during a few short weeks in September. The 1 million square kilometer ice-free threshold is important from a climate science perspective. This threshold represents a climactic tipping point where sea-ice coverage is so low that there is practically no insulating ice cap to reflect solar energy in the summer. With no insulating ice cap to protect it, the Arctic Ocean’s blue surface absorbs more and more solar energy. This added energy further reduces the Arctic’s cooling impacts on the global climate. This decidedly unpleasant phenomenon is known as the “Blue Ocean Event” and is typically what the science community is describing when referring to an ice-free Arctic. Still, even after the Blue Ocean Event, the “ice-free” Arctic will create significant amounts of sea-ice every winter and will still contain millions of square kilometers of sea-ice coverage for the majority of the year. Now that we have a better understanding of what ‘ice-free’ means, we can more effectively consider the feasibility of trans-polar shipping routes. Sea-ice’s impact on shipping depends on a litany of factors including the age of the ice, thickness, depth, and position. Failing to account for this remaining sea-ice and the litany of other challenges that operations in a warming Arctic presents is a recipe for disaster. Operational Challenges to Transpolar Shipping To address operational threats in the Arctic, the International Maritime Organization created a mandatory Polar Code to regulate commercial maritime activities beginning in 2017. The Polar Code specifies ship design and construction requirements, crew training, operational limitations, and environmental protection standards that must be observed to ensure safe operations in polar waters. While it is possible to retroactively modify warm-water ships to meet these polar code requirements, doing so is exceedingly costly. The Polar Code’s specifications are designed to minimize maritime risk, but in doing so they significantly increase operational cost per unit when compared to conventional shipping routes and therefore offset some of the cost advantages offered by the shorter transpolar routing. In addition to restrictions from the Polar code, bathymetry and ice-breaker size and availability further restrict operations on Arctic trans-polar routings by limiting the overall size of ships capable of making the journey. Even with the observed decline in sea ice extent; ice breaker escort remains a necessity through much of the Arctic – a reality that is not likely to for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, portions of both the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage require ships to maneuver through tight straits at relatively shallow depths, physically limiting the overall size and weight of container ships to roughly one third of the size typical for a Suez Canal transit. These size limitations coupled with the increased operational costs associated with Polar Code compliance means that container shipping through the Northern Sea Route or Northwest Passage is not likely to ever be economically viable at the scales seen through the Suez Canal. Great Power Competition and Arctic Surface Presence Although forecasted ice conditions in the Arctic will challenge transpolar shipping more than the “ice-free” descriptor initially indicates, this doesn’t mean that the Arctic won’t see an increase in surface vessel activity in the coming decades. From a geopolitical competition standpoint, surface presence in the Arctic is arguably more important now than ever. Whether it be China’s Polar Silk Road concept, America’s deep-water port ambitions in Nome, or Russia’s $21 billion Arctic LNG-2 extraction project; presence in the Arctic will have a profound shaping impact on geopolitics over the next decade. While the Arctic may be poised for development at an unprecedented rate, it is critical to temper strategic planning with the harsh climate realities and operational limitations that will persist even as the globe continues to warm. Given the Arctic’s sea-ice reality and increasing relevance as a great power competition domain, the United States’ icebreaker fleet is arguably more important now than ever. Unfortunately, America’s current icebreaking capacity is fairly limited and represents a significant capability gap compared to Chinese and Russian fleets. This capability gap was highlighted in late July when US Coast Guard Cutter Healy was forced to abandon its Arctic patrol mission and return to port due to an electrical fire onboard the aging vessel. The Healy is one of only two operational icebreakers capable of polar operations in the U.S. fleet and is the only icebreaker allocated for Arctic operations this summer. Meanwhile, as the Healy limped south for repairs, China continued to operate three polar capable icebreakers just off of Alaska’s northern coasts. While America’s ability to project surface presence in the Arctic may be less than ideal now, fortunately, there is change on the horizon. Icebreaker capacity remains a top priority for the U.S. Coast Guard. The Polar Security Cutter acquisition program seeks to right-size and modernize the U.S. Coast Guard fleet and is on track now to begin delivering vessels before the end of the decade. In the mean-time, the Coast Guard has taken steps to purchase the commercial icebreaker ‘Aiviq’ to be stationed in Alaska as a stop-gap measure while the Polar Security Cutter program progresses. The Aiviq announcement and Healy incident occur at the heels of the announcement of the ‘Icebreaker Collaboration Effort’ or ICE Pact, an initiative from the Biden-Harris administration aimed at improving international collaboration to facilitate future icebreaker procurement efforts. The Arctic has certainly seen, and continues to see, a decline in sea-ice levels as a result of global climate change. Still, even in the most aggressive “ice-free” predictions, the Arctic will contain significant amounts of sea-ice for the majority of the year. The operational challenges posed by this remaining sea-ice coupled with emerging interest in the Arctic as a domain of great power competition creates an environment wherein icebreaking capacity is more important now than ever. Investing in icebreakers remains crucial for maintaining access to the Arctic, establishing presence, and ultimately asserting national interests in the Arctic. As the Arctic transforms, building a robust icebreaker fleet is central to the United States’ capacity to safeguard security and stability in the North American Arctic. U.S. Air Force Major David Ince is assigned to Eleventh Air Force at Joint Base Elmendorf- Richardson, Anchorage, Alaska. He is an Air Force Fellow graduate of the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security and Climate Studies.