Venomed Quills: A Systematic Approach to Maximizing Taiwanese Endurance Published Oct. 9, 2024 By SOS AUAR, in Cooperation with the Air University Taiwan Deterrence Research Task Force Introduction Taiwan cannot directly compete with the PRC in conventional warfare; thus, survivability demands an asymmetric strategy that leverages a multitude of assets. Furthermore, Taiwan’s military is unlikely to significantly close the gap with China’s military capabilities in the near term. A 2023 RAND report posits that if the U.S. were to intervene to oppose a PRC invasion, it could take up to 90 days to fully marshal forces.[1] As outlined in 2017 by Taiwan’s then-Chief of the General Staff Admiral Lee Hsi-ming’s Overall Defense Concept (ODC), Taiwan’s best strategy for preventing the PRC’s seizure of Taiwan is to mount an asymmetric strategy postured to “attack the enemy on the sea, destroy the enemy in the littoral area, and annihilate the enemy on the beachhead.”[2] Taiwan must develop the capacity to accomplish these tasks over a period of months, dragging out any conflict, inflicting sustained attrition of invading forces, and denying the PRC a quick victory. To do this, Taiwan will need to build resiliency in its energy infrastructure, develop robust command and control (C2), and deploy the right assets to enable effective joint defense. The table below shows how this might be done on a reasonable budget and timeline using systems potentially available as part of presidential drawdown authority authorized in the 2024 NDAA. Although there is not time to implement these recommendations for FY24, strategists should debate these options for FY25 and beyond. Table 1. Allocation of $1.9B of DOD Stocks, Education and Training[3] Taiwan Must Have the Energy to Sustain the Poison To successfully resist the PRC, Taiwan will need energy resilience – especially if the PRC blockades the island. A real-life example occurred in August of 2022 of this need. In August of 2022, then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August of 2022. In response, the PRC surrounded the island for three days – revealing that Taiwan could not sustain power on its own for more than 11 days.[4] 98% of Taiwan’s fossil fuels come from imports. These basically consist of petroleum products, coal, and natural gas.[5] By 2025, 50% of Taiwan’s energy is projected to be generated from natural gas.[6] As such, Taiwan must maximize its energy efficiency while simultaneously reducing foreign dependence on these supplies. This occurs in two primary attacks: (1) increasing the efficiency of the current electrical gride and (2) diversifying energy supplies and storage capacity. First, Taiwan’s electrical gride can become more efficient by modernization the grid through automated programs and targeting energy toward critical infrastructure during an emergency situation. The island’s electrical grid is outdated and unoptimized. At least one plant, the Tung Hsiao power plant, is set to double energy output with the same supply of fuel over the next two years.[7] This is being done through PMUs and ADRPs. PMUs, or Phasor Management Units, work hand-in-hand with ADRPs, Automated Demand Reduction Programs. Simply put, these programs work to identify spikes of energy use across a circuit or wire and then automatically reduce that energy spike or revert energy from another circuit to compensate. With PMUs acting as the sensors that measure voltage and current magnitude at transition phases within a power system, the ADRPs act as the interpret of that data and automatically divert power where needed.[8] As one expert in the field remarked, “It’s no different than how your A/C operates when it’s on auto.”[9] On average, the Department of Energy accounts up to $140,000 for procuring PMUs.[10] Current DoD Facilities utilizing Open ADR 2.0 (an open-source ADRP) run $20,000 per installation and are currently in the field at Miramar Air Station.[11] The combination of these two programs works especially well with natural gas consumption and biomass waste-to-energy programs. Since Taiwan utilizes both, the ADRP program is even more attractive. The allotted funds account for the distribution of these systems across Taiwan’s military installations and 78 power plants. Additionally, DoD Personnel could be provided to not only train the Taiwanese on these programs, but also how to focus energy to critical infrastructure in an emergency.[12] A joint effort could also be conducted to develop a crisis management plan that would prioritize critical infrastructure sustainment (hospitals, energy production facilities, ports, highway road signs, military bases, government facilities, and water/sewage utilities), and then simulating a graceful degradation based on order of priority, would be one way to increase resiliency and maximize energy. By taking these two steps, Taiwan can increase the efficiency of its electrical grid. However, addressing efficiency and consumption is not enough. Increased storage capacity and portability must also be gained. In other words, diversifying energy supplies and storage is needed. Taiwan’s liquid natural gas (LNG) consumption continually grows; however, its capacity to store the LNG remains limited. As such, the U.S. could also provide LNG tanks to Taiwan. Again, Miramar Air Station provides examples of LNG storage tanks. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay just finished an LNG production facility that provides detailed plans regarding large storage capacity tanks.[13] A 90k gal LNG tank converts to 12.5M cubic feet of NG in its gas state.[14] Security of the tanks is simple. All LNG tanks can be placed underground or buried to offer cover and concealment of their locations. Combined with placing 14, 150KW generators at each of Taiwan’s eight main airbases– with a burn rate of 783 cubic feet of natural gas – 2 MW could easily be obtained. This would enable these installations to operate on supplemental power for 47.5 days independently of any additional supply. While LNG provides the most cost-effective approach, portability remains an issue; however, the preferred method is LNG because it is more efficient and cleaner than the use of diesel generators and fuel. This also syncs with public opinion on energy in Taiwan. Nevertheless, our plan does make provision for diesel as well. Through equivalent open-source diesel generators currently in DoD inventory, at each military installation, 14 diesel generators would need to burn through 4,032 gallons of diesel per day or 189,500 gallons to amount to the 47 days of power the LNG would provide; however, these generators are portable.[15] This comparison proves just how much more efficient and cost-effective NG generators are. Should these tanks and fuel supplies be provided, Taiwan could theoretically have 2 MW of supplemental energy at all 8 installations for 90 days with LNG and diesel fuel. While not solving the energy crisis, the combined utilization of fuel tanks and generators places Taiwan in a strong position to maintain critical supply to support the C2 mission and other military assets. Taiwan Must have the Capability to Spread the Poison In the event of an invasion, the PRC will likely prosecute targets against Taiwan’s C2 infrastructure to achieve information superiority.[16] Communications networks will be contested through cyberattacks, destruction of physical infrastructure, and electronic warfare. This will significantly strain or even disrupt Taiwan’s ability to maintain C2 over its dispersed forces. The redundancy and reliability of C2 will be vital to keeping Taiwan in the fight. This could be done through a cloud-based system. The Booz Allen Hamilton Modular Detachment Kit (MDK) is an off-the-shelf capability that could enable the Taiwanese military to send targets digitally to targeting systems, extend unclassified and classified networks for connectivity, and integrate UAV electronic intelligence (ELINT) data directly into the targeting kill web. The MDK system offers layered redundancy, with unsecure, secure, link, and SATCOM network capabilities. Five MDKs per TAF operating airbase would be sufficient to offer Taiwan this multidomain integration, bringing the total recommended MDK units to forty. At roughly $1,000 per MDK, this recommendation is extremely cost-effective at $40,000. Additionally, Taiwan will need to have a survivable and resilient C2 network extension capability. Taiwan already has a version of Link 16 and is scheduled to purchase upgraded Link 16 systems from the U.S. by 2026.[17] Link 16 is already a highly survivable C2 system through its frequency hopping and secure transmission protocols. One way to increase the survivability of the C2 network is to increase the number of tactical nodes using the Battlefield Awareness and Target System-Dismounted (BATS-D) developed by L3Harris. This system is a handheld Link- 16 radio and is currently in use by the Special Operations and Combat Search and Rescue communities within the USAF. Both the U.S. Navy and Army employ this system as well. It has a range of seventy-five nautical miles and runs on 12V rechargeable lithium-ion batteries. This radio operates on the L-Band and can pass Link-16 data and voice.[18] The price quote for one of these radios is $135,000 and twenty would evenly disburse redundancy across the network. Theoretically, this capability could be deployed with small teams that are equipped with the BATS-D that are geographically dispersed across the island to extend the Common Operating Picture (COP) generated by the Link 16 network. By having multiple nodes dispersed, even if the nodes are identified by PRC Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, the large number of systems emitting will confuse their targeting and slow the kill chain. Additionally, the small teams equipped with the system can simply turn the radio off and move to a new location before emitting it again. This rapid mobility will confuse the PRC’s kill chain even more. If a node is rendered inoperable, a new node could swiftly take its place, providing redundancy to the battle network. If the teams are vehicle-borne, the BATS-D could be paired with the BATS-D Vehicular Amplifier, which would extend its range to 200 nautical miles.[19] Considering the island of Taiwan is approximately 300 nautical miles long (north to south) and 90 miles wide (east to west), it would take only two vehicles with a BATS-D and BVA to cover the whole island and shoreline. Placing these nodes at the mountain peaks or tall buildings in urban areas will increase the radios coverage as well. Another consideration for Taiwan is its cybersecurity posture. In an invasion scenario, cyber-attacks by the PRC will likely occur before and during operations, much like in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These attacks will hamper Taiwan’s ability to manage C2 as its networks will be under siege.[20] Additional cyberspace tools may be needed. One possibility is a tool that was recently decommissioned in the USAF called Cyber Vulnerability Assessment/Hunter (CVA/H). This toolkit consists of multiple servers, a switch, laptops, and sensors. Combine this hardware with threat-hunting software, and you have a cyber weapon system capable of analyzing vulnerabilities and hunting malicious cyber activity. Each kit, dependent on how robust and what software is utilized, costs between $50,000 and $100,000 to build. They can be mobilized in ruggedized transfer kits and used in different locations. The CVA/H system was originally rolled out to Cyber units and Communications squadrons across the USAF for use by Mission Defense Teams (MDTs). These MDTs were expected to be the first line of defense against threats to IP-based weapon systems. Over time, the cost to retrain so many cyber professionals, the cost to manpower, and the later-than-expected fielding of some IP-based weapons systems led to the reduction of units required to operate the system. This equipment was never recalled by the Program Management Office (PMO) and has since been repurposed by some units. Considering the equipment is not End-of-Life or End-of- Service and if it has been repurposed, it is or can be updated with the latest patches to mitigate vulnerabilities. The PMO would need to recall the equipment and potentially provide replacements to any units that repurposed it. Once the systems are returned, any systems that were attached to classified networks would need to be sanitized. At that point, kits could be transferred to Taiwan. The kits could be pre-loaded with the latest threat hunting software like Security Onion (open source), or software approved by the Foreign Disclosure Office. Otherwise, Taiwan can load whichever software systems they deem necessary. In any case, the use of these systems will provide resilience for data networks during peacetime or in the event of an invasion. These assets provide targeted “bang-for-the-buck” C2 that will not only keep Taiwan in the fight longer but allow additional assets to proliferate across the island. Thus, providing kinetic assets remains crucial. After all, what good is a quill without a point? Taiwan Must Deliver Poison When Challenged In a worst-case scenario, a Joint Firepower Strike Campaign (JFSC) will significantly degrade Taiwan’s defensive capability in advance of PLA landing operations on the island.[21] As such, Taiwan will be at a disadvantage in combined arms warfare and face difficulty in slowing and attritting the PLA. To counter the PLA advantage in long-range fires and preserve TAF critical capabilities, Taiwan could obtain an array of assets including a package of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), maneuver-short-range air defenses (M-SHORAD), and MQ-1/-9 Multi- Spectral Targeting System (MTS) sensors. These systems provide mechanisms to enable ISR, strike, and surface-to-air capabilities that enhance Taiwan’s defensive capabilities. During an invasion of Taiwan, there will be little time to launch vulnerable ISR aircraft with other platforms taking priority. To maximize ISR coverage in this time-critical scenario, MQ-1 and MQ-9 MTS sensors could be mounted to existing infrastructure with large fields of view (i.e. radio towers, cell phone towers, and mountain tops) in the pre-conflict period. MQ-9s have already been provided to Taiwan; therefore, the knowledge of how to utilize the sensor is already in place and running smoothly. The MTS sensor provides electro-optical (EO), infrared (IR), and laser designation, which will prove vital throughout the initial invasion and following conflict.[22] Placing MTS on tall structures will provide Taiwan with an overwatch of suspected landing sites, major logistic routes, and airfields. Also, overlapping fields of view will provide multiple angles from which third-party laser designators can guide Taiwan’s AGM-114 Hellfire or NATO laser-guided munitions. Non-laser guided munitions can also take advantage of the MTS network as real-time target information and fire corrections can be passed to Taiwan’s artillery crews, increasing lethality and survivability.[23] An MTS sensor network will likely remain viable throughout the conflict because of its size and ability to blend in with other electronic equipment due to the prevalence of similar- looking traffic cameras throughout Taiwan. To further increase the MTS survivability, the sensor could be hardwired to reduce emissions and take advantage of the mounted infrastructure's power supply. While in some situations, this may impact the individual sensor’s ability to stay in the fight, radio towers associated with emergency response typically have generator backups. The creation of the MTS sensor network will provide ISR capabilities without incurring additional costs associated with aircraft. Similar tower-based surveillance systems have proven successful with the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol along the U.S.-Mexican border.[24] Additionally, a civilian justification for this system is the ability to monitor infrastructure during natural disasters, enabling smoother recovery operations by directing assets to where they are most needed. If the MTS network is in place, the Swedish RBS-17 launch system would pair well in Taiwan’s arsenal. This man-portable system allows for ground-launched AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, which will prove invaluable as aircraft resources are strained. For a more mobile asymmetric impact, the RBS-17 rail mount can be placed inside the back of small delivery trucks for concealment, allowing small teams to leverage MTS third-party targeting capabilities to enhance shoot-and-scoot tactics.[25] Given the PLA Rocket Force’s numerical advantages in ballistic missiles and the PLA Air Force’s capacity to employ air-to-surface munitions with overwhelming airpower, Taiwan’s traditional Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) assets may not be survivable in a sustained conflict. For air defenses, TAF primarily utilizes the U.S. Patriot Missile System and the Tien Kung (Sky Bow) series, which is based on the Patriot design. The country currently has 9 Patriots batteries and is expected to have 18 Tien Kung batteries by 2026; however, they operate from fixed sites and traditionally take over one hour to pack and move.[26] Maneuver-short-range air defense platforms, including the M-SHORAD Stryker and AN/TWQ-1 Avenger, provide viable alternatives for robust low-to-medium altitude surface-to-air defense systems. Incorporating these two weapons systems would not warrant extensive additional military training. Taiwan currently maintains Avenger vehicles in inventory but does not have any Stryker vehicles. However, the Stryker vehicle closely mirrors Taiwan’s fleet of CM-32/-33/-34 “Clouded Leopard” fighting vehicles. Taiwan operates roughly 378 CM-32/-33 and 305 CM-34 vehicles. The M-SHORAD Stryker variant and Avenger provide low-in surface-to-air capabilities, as both systems can employ Stinger missiles. Both systems have demonstrated cUAS capabilities as well. The Stryker leverages direct machine gun fire at closer ranges, and the Avenger can cue missiles with a laser rangefinder against targets with low heat signatures. Additionally, the Stryker may also carry two AGM-114L Hellfire missiles to integrate with the proposed MTS sensor strategy. These two M-SHORAD systems effectively serve as mobile MANPADS and add a layer of survivable and cost-effective surface-to-air assets in existing IADS.[27] The U.S. Army currently maintains approximately 4,466 Stryker vehicles and is expecting completed delivery of 144 M-SHORAD Stryker units by 2025.[28] The U.S. inventory also includes roughly 400 Avenger HMVWV systems.[29] Provisioning 40 M-SHORAD Strykers for $360M and 100 Avengers at $200M is possible. Building Taiwan’s munition stockpiles is also necessary. Hence, 500 Stinger missiles and 500 AGM-114 Hellfire rockets, evaluated at $50,000 and $150,000 per missile, respectively, for a cost of $25M and $75M could be provided. This combined total is roughly $660M. This allocation of Stinger missiles would help to augment the U.S.’s recent delivery of $500M worth of Stinger missiles and launcher equipment under Presidential Drawdown Authority.[30] While not presently in U.S. DoD stock, the L3 Vampire is another weapon system that provides layered defensive capabilities as a highly modular and mobile asset, particularly for cUAS. This capability integrates an advanced WESCAM MX-10D RSTA targeting sensor with its weapons station, allowing an operator to quickly and accurately engage targets. The low-cost, highly accurate AGR-20 Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System Rocket provides increased lethality for engaging small or soft targets. This weapon system may be acquired for low cost and employed on most vehicles with a cargo bed. For example, standard bongo porter vehicles throughout Taiwan could be retrofitted to deliver combat capabilities. This capability can additionally integrate with the proposed MTS sensor strategy, where the MTS provides a laser target designation for the AGR-20 laser-guided weapons. Additionally, by providing Taiwan various UAS the U.S. can cheaply supplement conventional forces with offensive and defensive capabilities. Two recent case studies illustrate this use case. The first is the Ukrainian use of UAS against Russian invasion forces. In that conflict, large, highly capable Group 4 and larger systems – such as the Bayracktar TB-2 – made an initial impression on the battlefield against Russian forces; however, Russian tactical adjustments quickly rendered the TB-2 vulnerable.[31] Instead, smaller more expendable commercial systems have become the preferred method in the Ukrainian battlespace. These systems, often converted racing or hobby drones, are typically used for reconnaissance missions but are also frequently jerry-rigged into strike vehicles by attaching droppable grenades or into one-way attack UAS (OWA-UAS) by attaching mortar rounds or other explosives to them. Both Ukraine and Russia have also started fielding purpose-built OWA-UAS such as the Zala Lancet or Switchblade 300.[32] The second recent example of asymmetric drone warfare is the Houthi movement in Yemen and its anti-ship campaign in the Red Sea. Unlike Ukraine, which demonstrates the tactical use of UAS in large force-on-force ground combat, the Houthi’s employment demonstrates the operational use of UAS in maritime interdiction. Using UAS in conjunction with anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, the Houthis have sustained consistent attacks against commercial and coalition military shipping for several months, depleting the U.S. Navy supply of over 100 SM-2 and SM-6 missiles used to destroy Houthi projectiles.[33] These sustained drains on logistics and readiness have been compounded by U.S. efforts to target and destroy Houthi sites associated with launching attacks. These two case studies demonstrate how providing Taiwan with a large fleet of UAS can help keep them in the fight longer in an invasion scenario. Smaller UAS and their support equipment are small, mobile, and easy to conceal. They are likely to survive an initial JFSC and remain available in large numbers for a prolonged period. As a result, UAS can supplement traditional air missions in support of ground forces, augmenting the likely depleted TAF. For example, large numbers of ISR UAS can cue OWA-UAS or conventional artillery systems onto targets, reducing the PLA’s ability to mass troops for offensive actions. A sustained trickle of OWA-UAS strikes can place PLAN crews under continuous pressure while depleting their limited stockpiles of air defense missiles, increasing the rates at which combatant vessels will need to return to port for replenishment. Additionally, UAS can be utilized in conjunction with ASCMs or other PGMs to overwhelm enemy air defenses and increase the likelihood of a hit. Combined, these UAS capabilities give the options to continue fighting effectively until assistance can arrive, even in the face of significant PRC conventional overmatch and degradation of traditional TAF assets. To facilitate these capabilities, the U.S. should provide Taiwan with the largest possible number of small UAS (group 3 and lower) that can fulfill ISR and/or strike roles. Examples of these types of systems include the RQ-21, the MQ-27, the RQ-11, the RQ-20, and the Switchblade 300/600 loitering munition. In addition, providing a smaller number of larger UAS such as the MQ-1 or the MQ-8 can also add value. While larger UAS have greater logistic requirements and are less survivable, their superior capability adds needed flexibility to the TAF UAS fleet. Such an aid package can provide massed effects at scale for relatively little cost. For example, at a replacement cost of $733 million the U.S. could provide Taiwan with a theoretical package of 3,500 Switchblade 300, 500 Switchblade 600,[34] 50 RQ-21, 200 MQ-27, and 500 MQ- 11 UAS totaling 4,750 airframes. Such a large number of systems would create a tremendous challenge for PLA air defense to counter. The U.S. can also provide 20 MQ-1s and 4 MQ-8s for an additional replacement cost of approximately $212 million.[35] While not necessarily compatible with current U.S inventory levels and obligations to other partners, this example demonstrates the tremendous value proposition small UAS can provide and makes a case for providing Taiwan as many systems as can be spared. Furthermore, Taiwan can generate mobile and lethal tactical teams through force packing an M-SHORED Stryker or Avenger with an RQ-11 for persistent ISR, Switchblade 300/600 munitions for lethal capabilities, and a BATS-D terminal for secure C2. This creates another capability to attrit PLAN landing vessels and sealift capabilities as well as contest the low-to- medium altitude airspace to counter PLAAF airlift. The combination of these various weapon systems reflects an asymmetric approach to potential conflict with the PLA that emphasizes mobility and survivability. By following such an approach, Taiwan can extend its ability to resist despite heavy losses to its conventional air forces, increasing the time the U.S. and other partners have to enter the conflict and provide support.[36] This is likely the best available option to counter the PRC’s advantage in long-range fires and deny it a quick victory. At a minimum, it certainly keeps the quill sharp. Conclusion By applying an asymmetric approach, Taiwan can revitalize its energy grid to provide sustained energy to key facilities. Moreover, with C2 upgrades, Taiwan could ensure sufficient communication across the island. Finally, using UAS, Taiwan could directly attack back when necessary. Ultimately, this leaves Taiwan with the ability to stay in the fight past the initial wave and 90 days thereafter, leading to a higher likelihood of victory and deterrence against the PLA. This analysis was done as part of the Squadron Officer School Advanced Research Elective, in cooperation with the Air University Taiwan Deterrence Research Task Force. Captain Jonathan Banks is an intelligence officer serving at Headquarters SOCCENT at MacDill AFB Tampa Florida as the executive intelligence cell officer in charge. Prior to this he served at SOCCENT headquarters as the OIC for Strategic Competition within the intelligence directorate and received his Master's in War and Society at Chapman University in Orange California, He has deployed to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar managing intelligence production for Joint Special Operations Task Force Central. Captain Zachery Butler is an Expeditionary Communications Officer serving as Team Chief of Cyberspace Security Cooperations at Air Forces Southern at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. Prior to this, he has served with the 347th Rescue Group as a Cyber Systems Liaison Officer, Executive Officer to the Rescue Group Commander, and Operations Flight Commander at the 23d Communication Squadron. He has deployed to the AFCENT Cyber Capabilities Center managing the AFCENT Wide-area-network for operations in the Middle East. Captain Nicholas Justus is an Intelligence Officer serving as Flight Commander at the 553d Intelligence Squadron, Beale Air Force Base, California. Prior to this, he served as a CBRN Simulations Analyst and Mission Director at the Air Force Technical Applications Center. In 2010, he earned his bachelor's degree in political science from the University of Central Florida. In 2018, he commissioned through Officer Training School. Captain Thomas Molnar is an active-duty F-16 pilot stationed at Osan AB, ROK with the 36th Fighter Squadron. He graduated from the US Air Force Academy in 2018 with a B.S. in Computer Engineering and received his M.S. in Computer Engineering from Purdue University in 2020. Having participated in international exercises across South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and Alaska, he has extensive operational experience in the USINDOPACOM theater and with Agile Combat Employment (ACE) operations. Captain David Rogers is an Area Defense Counsel (ADC) at Joint Base San Antonion – Lackland, Trial Defense Division. He represents a base population of 25K personnel in all criminal and administrative actions. Prior to being an ADC, he served as the Chief of Operational Law at Fairchild, AFB where he worked extensively with the SERE school and OPERATION GLOBAL THUNDER. He received his law degree from the University of Missouri School of Law and bachelor’s degrees in political science and international studies from the University of Central Missouri. During law school, he sat as an Editor for the Missouri Law Review. He is a member of the Order of the Barristers and a recipient of the George H. Charno Award. Captain Jonathan Schnicker is a Contracting Officer serving as Global Port Operations Lead at USTRASCOM Acquisition Directorate, Scott AFB, Illinois. Prior to contracting he served as an enlisted weather technician/ weather systems support cadre out of Hurlburt Field, Florida. He has three deployments and many forward deployments to locations all over Eastern Africa and CENTCOM AORs. He earned his bachelor's degree in business management through the University of Arkansas and earned his commission through Officer Training School in 2018. Captain Cailey Wagner is an Evaluator Air Battle Manager on the E-3 AWACS at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. She commissioned from the University of Memphis in 2017 with a B.A. in Psychology. Currently she serves at the 552nd Operations Group and prior to that was the Deputy Chief of Weapons and Tactics at the 960th Airborne Air Control Squadron. She is a C2 Team Lead and Mission Commander with two deployments to the CENTCOM and EUCOM AORs. [1] Timothy R. Heath, Sale Lilly, Eugeniu Han, “Can Taiwan Resist a Large-Scale Military Attack by China?” RAND, June 27, 2023, pgs. 52-53. [2] Drew Thompson, "Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to Lose," in Crossing the Strait, ed. Joel Wuthnow et al (Washington D.C.: NDU Press, 2022), pg. 322. [3] “AP Electric & Generators LLC.” AP Electric & Generators LLC, 2024. [4] Liu, Kwangyin, “A Charged Debate: Taiwan’s Nuclear Energy Conundrum.” Commonwealth Magazine, April 15, 2024. [5] “What Is the Existing Energy Mix and Current Energy Policy in Taiwan?” Energy Administration, Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C., updated December 28, 2023. [6] Liu, "A Charged Debate." [7] “Renewable Energy with Taiwan Power: GE Vernova.” Gepower-V2, 2021. [8] Maj Garret Karnowski, P.E. “Interview on Electrical Engineering and Infrastructure Prioritization.” 13 Aug. 2024. [9] Maj Garret Karnowski, P.E. [10] Department of Energy. Factors Affecting PMU Installation Costs. October 2014. [11] Department of Defense. ESTCP Cost and Performance Report: Automated Demand Response for Energy Sustainability, September. 2015; “Enabling Widespread Secure Automated Demand Management and Demand Response on DOD Facilities Using OpenADR 2.0.” Serdp-Estcp.mil, September 15,. 2020. [12] While the focus of this paper deals with the appropriate of training and education from DoD personnel, additional personnel could come from the DoE or Homeland Security. [13] Jeffrey Hamlin, “Naval Station Guantanamo Bay Commissions New Energy Efficient Power Plant,” United States Navy, September 11, 2023. [14] https://statics.teams.cdn.office.net/evergreen-assets/safelinks/1/atp-safelinks.html [15] https://statics.teams.cdn.office.net/evergreen-assets/safelinks/1/atp-safelinks.html [16] Michael Casey, "Firepower Strike, Blockade, Landing: PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict," in Crossing the Strait, pg. 117. [17] Aaron Tu & Jake Chung, “Link 16 purchase to be completed by 2026,” Taipei Times, August 1, 2024. [18] L3Harris, “Battlefield Awareness and Targeting System-Dismounted Sell Sheet,” 2022 [19] L3Harris, “BATS Vehicular Amplifier Sell Sheet,” 2022. [20] Minister Kuo-Cheng, Chiu, “ROC National Defense Report 2023,” pg. 41. [21] Michael Casey, “Firepower Strike, Blockade, Landing: PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict,” in Crossing the Strait, pgs. 120-122 [22] RTX. “Multi-Spectral Targeting System (MTS).” [23] RTX, “Raytheon's MTS-B delivers leading-edge surveillance technology to the US Air Force,” July 20, 2012. [24] The Electronic Frontier Foundation, “Surveillance Technology U.S.-Mexico Border,” n.d. [25] While outside the scope of this paper, this provides another area for research and something that can be formally provided upon request from the U.S. [26] Focus Taiwan, ”Taiwan to build 12 new domestic TK III missile sites by 2026,” CAN English, Taipei, October 23, 2023; Department of the Army, FM 3-01: U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations, 2020, pgs. 7–8. [27] “Taiwan,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, 18 July 2018. [28] Sydney J Freedberg, “GDLS Gets $1.2B for 144 Army Anti-Aircraft Strykers,” Breaking Defense, October 1, 2020. [29] “Avenger Air Defense System,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, July 2020. [30] ”Taiwanese Armed Forces Receive $500 Million Stinger Missile Package from the US,” MilitaryLeak, 27 March 2023. [31] Stacy L. Pettyjohn, “Drones are Transforming the Battlefield in Ukraine but in an Evolutionary Fashion,” War on the Rocks, March 5, 2024. [32] Quentin Sommerville, “Ukraine Thrown into War's Bleak Future as Drones Open New Battlefront,” BBC, 24 July 2024. [33] Yoni Tobin and Daniel Bahat, “U.S. Must Defeat Houthis’ Asymmetric Warfare Strategy,” Jewish Institute for National Security of America, May 6, 2024. [34] Already being provided to Taiwan. [35] "Scan Eagle," USAF; Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “United Arab Emirate (UAE) – RQ-21A BlackJack Unmanned Air Vehicles,” May 24, 2019;“RQ-11B Raven,” USAF; “MQ-1B Predator”, USAF; Jan Tegler, “US Navy’s MQ-8C Fire Scouts Fly Into Retirement Just Two Years After Entering Operational Service,” Flight Global, 29 May 2024; David Hambling, “The U.S. Army Won’t Buy Any More Switchblade 300 Kamikaze Drones,” 19FortyFive, 23 July 2023. [36] Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham, "The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan," Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 9, 2023, p. 123-125.